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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
GORDON LEON WALLS : Case No. 20030139 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
The State, in its Brief of Appellee, raises several issues, which were not fully 
addressed by the Appellant in the Appellant's brief. The first issue is that this 
Court should overturn a line of cases that allows the review of Rule 11 violations 
under the plain error doctrine. The second issue argues that the Defendant's 
actions constituted invited error, and therefore should be disallowed. The final 
claim is that the Defendant's constitutional claim that he was incompetent fails on 
the grounds that Appellant did not properly marshal the evidence. The Appellant 
will address each of these issues in the order listed above. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT OVERRULE THE LINE OF 
CASES ALLOWING APPELLATE REVIEW OF A RULE 11 
VIOLATION UNDER THE PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE 
The State has argued in its brief that this Court should overrule a long line of 
cases that have applied the plain error doctrine in a Rule 11 violation. (See; State v. 
Dean 57 P.2d 1106, (Utah Ct. App. 2002), State v. Hittle 47 P.3d 101 (Utah 2003), 
State v. Tarnawiecki 5 P.3d 1222 (Utah 2002), State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), State v. Ostler, 996 P.2d 1065, (Utah Ct. App. 2000), and 
State v. Valencia, 116 P.2d 1332, (Utah Ct. App. 1989)) The State has made this 
argument cognizant of the doctrine of stare decisis, and the substantial burden that 
is required in overturning prior precedent. Defendant agrees that the doctrine of 
stare decisis is applicable and that the burden required for overturning prior 
precedent is substantial. The Defendant disagrees with the State that this is an 
appropriate case in which to do so. 
The Utah Appellate Courts have long recognized the plain error doctrine, 
and have applied it in numerous cases and settings. A small sampling of these 
cases include: State in re T.M. v. State, 73 P.3d959, (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 
(recognizing plain error on parental termination cases); State v. Dominguez, 72 
P.3d 127, (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (plain error claim available in both hearsay 
testimony and the State eliciting testimony beyond the scope of a pretrial ruling); 
State v. Smith, 65 P.3d 648, (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (plain error argument allowed in 
a failure to properly instruct a jury issue); State v. Bloomfield, 63 P.3d 110 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2003) (court allowed plain error analysis of a lack of foundation issue); 
State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 2002) (plain error doctrine applied to a failure 
to object to jury instruction); State v. Samora, 59 P.3d 604 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) 
(plain error review in an improper sentence case which resulted in a reversal. This 
case applied a plain error analysis despite the failure to brief such by appellant 
counsel); State v. Bradley, 57 P.3d 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (plain error review 
of prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Diaz, 55 P.3d 1131 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) 
(plain error analysis allowed in an insufficient evidence case); State v. Calliham, 
55 P.3d 573 (Utah 2002) (plain error review of confrontation clause violation); and 
State v. Bluff 52 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2002) (plain error review applied to an 
ineffective assistance of counsel case) 
The State is requesting that this Court carve out a limited exception to the 
plain error doctrine seeking that it not be applied in Rule 11 cases. In doing so the 
State is asking that this Court ignore the very reason for the plain error doctrine. 
Utah Appellate Courts have long recognized the necessity of plain error doctrine to 
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice due to the occasional inadequacies in trial 
counsel. In State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) the Court stated: 
3 
The plain error rule permits the appellate court to assure that justice is 
done, even if counsel fails to act to bring a harmfully erroneous ruling 
to the attention of the trial court. 
The very concept of justice presumes that all individuals be treated equally. 
This is particularly necessary when those individuals are criminal defendants. The 
constant striving of courts to meet this concept of justice and equal protection 
under the law is a basic tenet to the very Constitution of this country. The 14th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. {Emphasis added) 
Likewise, the Constitution of the State of Utah, and Article I Section 2 
provides; "All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments 
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit". 
While Appellant recognizes that this goal of justice and equal protection 
may not be universally attainable, this Court should do everything in its power in 
advancement of this noble objective. 
The Merriam Webster's Dictionary definition of justice includes: "the quality 
of the being just, impartial, or fair"; and "the principal or ideal of just dealing or 
right action". This definition is at the heart of the plain error doctrine. This Court 
has long recognized that occasionally criminal defendants are not adequately 
represented. This Court has established the plain error doctrine to rectify those 
inequitable situations. 
Finally, the State proposes that the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §77-
13-6 somehow precludes appellate court review of a Rule 11 issue. The language 
of Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 is not specialized in its directive that the trial court 
makes the original review. In many cases where the appellate courts have applied 
the plain error doctrine, there is a statute that specifically directed the trial court to 
make the original decision. (See Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 104(a); Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure Rule 17(6); Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 19(e); 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 22(e); Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 24(a)). Furthermore, a review on appeal, as in the present case, promotes 
finality in that the defendant would thereafter be precluded from raising that issue 
under a Rule 65B1 motion. 
The State has cited the case of State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703 (Utah App. 
1994) to support their position that the trial court should have the final say 
regarding the withdrawal the plea. (Appellee Br. 29) The court in State v. 
Brocksmith however noted the Appellant Courts duty to review, and reverse if 
necessary, an abuse of discretion by the trial court in a Rule 11 case in stating: 
A trial court's failure to comply strictly with Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting a guilty plea is good cause, 
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 Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea. State v. Smith, 812 
P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992); see also State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah App. 1994) 
(holding that trial court has abused discretion as matter of law if it 
does not permit withdrawal of plea not made in strict compliance with 
Rule 11). {State v. Brocksmith Footnote 1 at 707) 
The Appellee claims that this Court should overturn a number of cases that 
have sought to ensure justice. The Appellee offers little by way of reason for this 
departure from justice. The Defendant would submit that the interest of justice 
requires the upholding of this line of case law. By doing so, this Court can bolster 
public confidence in the court system with little detrimental effect. The result of 
granting the Appellant's request on appeal does not unjustly free him from all legal 
obligations. Rather the result is that the matter be sent back to the trial court for a 
proper and just disposition. That disposition will be either a trial on the merits, or 
the entry of a plea negotiation wherein the Defendant is fully informed of all of his 
rights. That disposition will not result in charges being dropped against the 
Defendant, nor does the Defendant seek that remedy. 
Finally, the State asks this Court to reverse the plain error doctrine in Rule 
11 cases because it lacks analytical support. The fact that this Court has not made 
an extensive analytical analysis of the plain error rule as applied to a Rule 11 
violation does not mean that this Court has blindly applied the plain error rule in 
this circumstance. The doctrine of stare decisis allows this Court to simply cite a 
case, with the understanding that the previous analysis contained in those cited 
cases would apply to the case at bar. To propose that the Appellate Courts be 
required to do otherwise would result in appellate decisions hundreds of pages 
long. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S RULE 11 CLAIMS ARE NOT INVITED 
ERROR. 
The State's next point is that the Defendant's Rule 11 claims should be 
rejected as invited error. Although the Appellate Courts have periodically ruled 
that if the defendant led the court into the error, they are precluded from claiming 
plain error under the invited error rule. (See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 
(Utah 1997)) This Court has ruled that Rule 11 must be strictly adhered to, and any 
failure constitutes a violation. In State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, ^ f 23 the Court 
reiterated its long-standing requirement of strict compliance in Rule 11 cases. 
This Court in the case of State v. Corwell 1A P.3d 1171 (Utah App. 2003) 
was presented with a case with almost identical facts to the case at bar. In Corwell, 
the court ruled: 
The State contends that by failing to include the right to a speedy trial 
and the provision concerning the limited right to appeal in the plea 
statement, and by failing to point out the omissions when the trial 
judge asked "if there was anything either one of you would have me 
ask your client regarding Rule 11 appointments," Corwell invited 
error. We disagree. "[I]t is not sufficient to assume that defense 
attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand the contents of 
n 
the affidavit." [State v Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1313 (Utah 1987)]. 
The duty to ensure that defendants know and understand the rights 
they are surrendering when pleading guilty rests not on the parties, but 
on the trial court. (State v. Corwell at 1175) 
In the present case the State contends that by stating to the trial court, that 
the plea hearing colloquy complied with Rule 11, the defendant invited the trial 
court error. The holding in State v. Corwell infra would indicate otherwise. 
Furthermore the argument of the defendant in his motion to withdraw plea was that 
the plea was not voluntarily entered. Although the majority of that hearing focused 
on the defendant's mental capacity to enter the plea, the issue of voluntariness 
clearly was raised at the trial court level. The fact that defense counsel did not 
raise the issue of the illusory promise of the plea negotiations is exactly the type of 
issue this court should here on appeal. If defense counsel was ignorant of the 
illusory nature of the prosecutors promise to write to the Board of Pardons, then 
the plain error standard would apply. If defense counsel knew that the prosecutors 
promise was of no effect, and thereafter allowed his client to enter a plea without 
informing him of this critical fact, then plain error needs to apply. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT DID PROPERLY MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE WITH REGARDS TO THE DEFENDANT'S 
MENTAL STATUS AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF PLEA. 
The State contends that the Defendant did not properly marshal the evidence 
and therefore this Court should summarily reject Defendant's claims. (Appellee 
Br. 38) The State contends that the Defendant made only two references to the 
alienist's findings in their brief. (Appellee Br. 39) The State fails to describe to the 
Court the extensive marshaling of evidence in the statement of facts. At the risk of 
becoming duplicative the Defendant submits the following as evidence of its 
attempt marshal evidence. This is found at pages 12 and 13 of Appellant Brief. 
Mr. Potter interviewed the defendant and found "Bottom line 
on it was that seemed to me he was tracking appropriately, that he 
understood what the charges were, he understood the possible 
penalties. " (R. 183/17) He testified that the defendant told him that he 
heard voices, which had told him to enter the guilty plea, but Mr. 
Potter stated, "With the information that he gave me about the way 
the voices were ostensibly acting at that point in time did not seem 
consistent with the way that auditoiy hallucinations work with a 
person who has schizophrenia. " (R. 183/20) Mr. Potter stated that at 
the time of the interview that he "felt him to be competent" but that he 
didn 't make a specific finding of competence for the period of March 
26, 2002. (R. 183/25) 
Dr Rick Hawks also evaluated the defendant for mental competency. 
He testified that it was possible that the defendant was faking mental 
illness. (R. 183/32) He also found originally that the defendant may 
have so mental illness, including schizophrenia, but could not make 
such a finding, or rule such a diagnosis out. (R. 183/32,33) 
Furthermore, he did not do an analysis of the defendant's mental state 
as of the date of the plea, and therefore the court continued the 
hearing, appointed another psychologist, and instructed both to 
determine the defendant's mental competency as of the date of the 
plea. (R. 183/63-67) 
After additional examinations Dr. Hawks produced an amended 
report, and testified on Jan28, 2003 that at the time of the plea the 
defendant "appeared to comprehend and appreciate the charges and 
allegations against him." (R. 184/10) He demonstrated the ability to 
disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind, " (R. 
184/10) and was able to "adequately [comprehend] and [appreciate] 
the range and nature of possible penalties." (R. 184/10) He 
understood the adversary nature of the proceedings against him " and 
manifested appropriate courtroom behavior on March 26 [2002] " (R. 
184/10,11) Dr. Hawks testified that the defendant did have a mental 
illness in the "schizophrenic spectrum", "a psychotic thought 
disorder, perhaps. " (R. 184/15) 
Dr. Beverly 0 'Connor, a neuropsychologist was then called to testify. 
She testified that although it was possible the defendant was faking a 
mental illness, she thought he was trying to cooperate, and not faking 
a mental illness. (R.184 /27,33) 
The Defendant then made his arguments and condensed this lengthy 
recitation of facts into two very clear conclusory statements. The defendant has 
adequately marshaled the evidence, and therefore this Court should address the 
issue raised. 
DATED this f2. daY o f November, 2003. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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